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The President’s Social Security Plan: 
How Much Would You Pay to Participate? 
1   Introduction 
 The first modern social security program in the world was started in Germany in 1889.  In 
1935 the United States became the 55th country to initiate a similar program.  Since then the social 
security program has become perhaps the most popular government program in the United States.  
Most developed countries now have some version of a social security program.  Across the globe 
countries are grappling with demographic changes that threaten the viability of these programs.  
 The most common form of these programs is a pay-as-you-go system.  Taxes are collected 
from current workers and that money is used to pay current retirees.  No real assets are actually set 
aside to pay retirees in the future.  The system worked well for many decades but problems are 
looming on the horizon.  The primary problem in the United States is that the number of workers per 
retiree has dropped from about 16 in 1950 to about 3 currently and is projected to drop to about 2 
by 2030.  There are three main contributing factors to this problem.  First, because of medical 
breakthroughs people tend to live longer.  A person who reached the age of 65 was expected to live 
an additional 12.6 years in 1935.  Today a person who reaches 65 is expected to live 17 more years 
and by 2040 that person is expected to live 19 more years.  Second, many more people are deciding 
to retire early.  The percentage of people in their early sixties who remain in the work force has 
dropped from 77 percent in 1960 to around 55 percent currently.  The people who retire early begin 
to collect from the system (at admittedly lower rates) rather than contribute to the system.  Third, 
birth rates have been falling since the 1950's which cause the work force to be replenished at a 
decreasing rate.1 
 Currently the United States social security system collects more taxes than it pays out.  
Beginning in 2017 these surpluses are projected to become deficits.  By 2030 the annual deficits are 
projected to be $275 billion and $719 billion by 2070.  By 2077 deficits will have accumulated to a 
liability of an estimated $25 trillion.  Two obvious ways to avert these large deficits are to collect 
more taxes or pay lower benefits.  The effect of either of these alternatives would be to lower the 
return that participants realize in the program.  One estimate has a couple with two children born in 
1932 receiving about a 4.74 percent return, after inflation, on their participation in pay-as-you-go 
system.  The same couple born in 1976 will earn about 2.6 percent.  Those born later will earn 
progressively less.2 
 In an attempt to remedy these problems many countries have changed their pay-as-you go 
systems to systems where some of the taxes collected are placed in an investment account in the 
                                                 
1 One good source of background on social security is Social Security Basics (2002). 
2 Ibid. 
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taxpayer's name.  These private accounts are typically invested in a mixture of bond and stock 
mutual funds. These accounts will partially fund the worker's retirement and will possibly lessen the 
government deficits in the future and provide a higher return for the participants.  So far more than 
twenty countries have added these types of accounts to their social security systems.  In the United 
States, the President has proposed allowing workers to divert 4 percent of their income to private 
accounts. 
 Are these private accounts a good idea for workers?  There is a great deal of discussion and 
disagreement about the answer to this question.  Of course, the answer partially depends upon what 
happens in the future.  This paper attempts to show some conditions under which private accounts 
are a good idea or a bad idea for workers.  We use an economic model to examine a representative 
worker and see how he might fare under differing circumstances. We use the idea of a "cash 
equivalent" to determine how much this individual would be willing to pay to be allowed to 
participate in the new private account system or how much he would need to be paid to agree to 
participate. 
 
2   A simple model of social security3 
 In this model, we examine a representative individual whose work life is [0, T], and 
retirement is [T, T ].  The retirement date is exogenous and the lifespan is certain.4  The economy-
wide real, pre-tax wage rate is w(t), which grows at rate x.   The social security tax rate is θ , and 
is autonomous for simplicity.  We assume that a fraction of the tax, α , flows into a private 
account, k(t).  Thus, we define α  as the “rate of private funding” and, therefore, )(twαθ  is the 
individual’s annual contribution to the private account, and )()1( twθα−  is the individual’s annual 
contribution to the pay-as-you-go system.  In the current, unfunded program, %6.10=θ  and 0=α , 
and under the President’s current proposal, the tax rate stays the same (i.e., %6.10=θ ) but 4 
percent of wage income would be used to fund private accounts, thus %38%6.10/%4 ==α , and 
the remaining 6.6 percent stays in the unfunded, pay-as-you-go system. 
Thus, in a partially funded system the agent pays )(twθ  for all ],0[ Tt ∈  and is paid an 
annual social security benefit Rtwtb )()1()( θα−=  for all ],[ TTt ∈ , where R is the ratio of the 
number of workers to retirees in the economy at the time benefits are received.5  And he is also able 
                                                 
3 Our model bears significant resemblance to Feldstein (1985). 
4 See Feldstein (1974) for a discussion of the effect of social security on the date of retirement, and see Bütler 
(2001) for uncertain lifetime in a life-cycle model. 
5 This formulation of the social security program makes a number of simplifying assumptions that are not 
central to the point of the paper.  First, the supply of labor is perfectly inelastic so that the entire burden of 
social security taxation falls on the individual worker.  Second, we exclude the possibility of budget surpluses 
or shortages.  Third, we ignore the administrative costs of the social security program, which do not represent 
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to withdraw funds from his private account during retirement.  At retirement, the balance in the 
private retirement account, )(Tk , is 
(1) ∫ −=
T
dttTrtwTk
0
))(exp()()( αθ  
where r is the rate of return in the private account.  We assume the individual is able to annuitize 
)(Tk  so that the account is zeroed-out at the date of death, i.e., 0)( =Tk .  This annuity, A, is the 
particular solution to the differential equation 
(2) Atrktk −=• )()(  
with the boundary conditions given by (1) and 0)( =Tk .  It can be shown that A is 
(3) 
dttTr
TTrTkA
T
T
))(exp(
))(exp()(
−
−=
∫
   
 
2.1   Calibration 
We consider an individual who begins working at age 25, retires at age 65 and dies at age 
80.  The variables T and T  are measured as the number of years after the individual begins 
working.  Our benchmark calibration is: 
• Market rate of return: %3=r  
• Social security tax rate: %6.10=θ  
• Date of retirement: 40=T  
• Date of death: 55=T  
• Initial wage rate: 000,40$)0( =w  
• Growth rate of real wages: %1=x  
(Nordhaus 1999) reports that the after-tax, real rate of return on US corporate capital is 
roughly 6 percent.  On the other hand, the after-tax, real rate of return on Treasury Bills can 
sometimes approach zero percent.   We split the difference and use 3 percent for our benchmark 
estimate, which is very close to the rate typically used in the life-cycle consumption literature 
(Gourinchas and Parker 2002, Bullard and Feigenbaum 2004, Feigenbaum 2005).  The retirement 
part of the social security program in the US is funded by payroll taxes equal to 10.6 percent of 
earnings (up to a cap of $87,900 in 2004).  The liability is divided evenly between workers and 
employers, but if the supply of labor is perfectly inelastic the worker pays the full 10.6 percent; 
                                                                                                                                                             
a large portion of the total social security budget.  Fourth, the taxation of benefits is ignored since in the real 
world these revenues are channeled right back into the social security program.  Fifth, we focus only on social 
security retirement benefits and ignore social security disability benefits.  
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thus, we assume %6.10=θ .  And our benchmark estimate for the rate of real wage growth, 1 
percent, is the average annual growth in real earnings in the US over the 10-year period ending in 
December 2004.6   
 
2.2   IRR 
The internal rate of return (IRR) on the private account is equal to the market rate of return, 
r.   If the market rate of return exceeds the internal rate of return in an unfunded program, switching 
from an unfunded to a partially funded system should provide greater retirement wealth for the 
individual, for a given level of tax collections.  
Thus, it is instructive to calculate the internal rate of return in an unfunded program.   To do 
so, we set α , the rate of private funding, to zero and we find the interest rate, i, that solves the 
following equation 
(4) ∫∫ −=−
T
T
T
RdttwtTidttwtTi )())(exp()())(exp(
0
θθ  
 The left side of (4) gives the value of all social security tax collections (valued at the date of 
retirement) and the right side is the amount needed at retirement to sustain withdrawals equal to 
Rtwtb )()( θ= , the social security benefit.  The internal rate of return in an unfunded program is the 
value of i that solves (4).  For our baseline calibration with R = 3, we obtain %42.1=i .  Over the 
next few decades, the ratio of workers to retirees is scheduled to fall to 2, due in part to declining 
birth rates and increasing life-expectancies.  In this case, %1.0−=i . 
 It is important to note that the internal rate of return does not depend on the size of the 
program, i.e., the social security tax rate θ  can be canceled from both sides of equation (4), leaving 
the internal rate of return as an implicit function of other parameters such as the wage growth rate 
and the ratio of workers to retirees. 
Figures 1–3 show the break-even rates of real wage growth under alternative assumptions 
about the market rate of return and the ratio of workers to retirees.7  In Figure 1, we assume that 
market rate is 3 percent.  When the ratio of workers to retirees is 3, and the economy-wide rate of 
real wage growth is greater than 2.6 percent, the internal rate of return in the pay-as-you-go 
program will be higher than the market rate of return.   When the IRR lines are above the 3 percent 
                                                 
6 The Bureau of Labor Statistics, Series Id: CES0500000049. 
7 There are a few technical points regarding all three figures that should be emphasized.  First, the IRR lines are 
45-degree lines, indicating that a 1 percent increase in the rate of real wage growth leads to a 1 percent 
increase in the IRR.  Second, the IRR is greater than the rate of real wage growth under current demographic 
conditions (R =3), and is less under future demographic conditions (R = 2).  This is seen by noting where the 
IRR lines touch the vertical-axis.  Third, the ratio of workers to retirees, R, scales the IRR line up or down, but 
does not affect its slope. 
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horizontal line the current pay-as-you-go program dominates the new proposed program.  If the ratio 
falls from 3 to 2, the real wages must grow at 4.1 percent or more for the pay-as-you-go program 
to have a higher internal rate of return.   
 
Figure 1.  Break-Even Rates of Real Wage Growth 
(Market rate of return, r = 3%)
%        IRR (R = 3)
IRR (R = 2)
3
2.6 4.1 Real wage 
growth
 
Figure 2.  Break-Even Rates of Real Wage Growth 
(Market rate of return, r = 6%)
%        IRR (R = 3)
IRR (R = 2)
6
5.6 7.1 Real wage 
growth
 
 
 
 
 
In Figures 1-3, the 45-degree lines show the IRR of the pay-as-you-go program for varying levels of 
real wage growth.  Each figure has two IRR lines, one for current demographic conditions (R = 3) and 
one for future demographic conditions (R = 2).  In Figure 1, the market rate of return is set at 3.0 
percent, our benchmark.  When the IRR is above the 3.0 percent line this indicates levels of wage 
growth for which the pay-as-you-go program is better than the private account program.  Figures 2 
and 3 are similar except that the market rate of return is set to 6.0 percent and 0.0 percent 
respectively.  The graphs show that as the market rate of return increases, higher levels of wage 
growth are needed for the pay-as-you-go program to break even. 
 
Figure 3.  Break-Even Rates of Real Wage Growth 
(Market rate of return, r = 0%)
%        IRR (R = 3)
IRR (R = 2)
-0.4 1.1 Real wage 
growth
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Figure 2 shows similar results under the assumption that the market rate of return is 6 
percent.  Here we see that the rate of real wage growth must be extremely high, 5.6 percent if R = 
3 and 7.1 percent if R = 2, in order to render an above-market internal rate of return.  However, in 
the case where the market rate of return is zero, Figure 3 shows that the pay-as-you-go program 
appears more favorable.  In this case, when R = 3, wage growth only needs to be above -0.4 
percent for the pay-as-you-go program to have a higher IRR.  When R = 2 a wage growth over 1.1 
percent will provide the pay-as-you-go program a higher return. 
Of course, the future rate of real wage growth is uncertain, but we can look to the US 
experience over the last couple of decades as a point of reference.  Table 1 provides summary 
statistics on the wage growth rate, taken from The Bureau of Labor Statistics.  For the 30-year 
period ending in December 2004, the highest annual rate of real wage growth was 2.6 percent.  
Thus, even if we expect wages to grow in the future at a rate equal to the 30-year high, Figures 1 
(i.e., where the market rate of return is 3 percent) suggests that a pay-as-you-go program will just 
barely break even under current demographic conditions (R = 3) and will have a below-market rate 
of return under future conditions (R = 2).  If the market rate of return is 6 percent (e.g., as in Figure 
2), a pay-as-you-go system will earn a below-market rate of return unless real wages in the future 
consistently grow at significantly faster rate than the 30-year high of 2.6 percent. 
Table 1.  Annual Rates of Real Wage Growth in the US*
10-year high 2.6%
10-year low 0.0%
10-year average 1.1%
20-year high 2.6%
20-year low -2.2%
20-year average 0.2%
30-year high 2.6%
30-year low -4.9%
30-year average -0.1%
These data are from the BLS, Series Id: CES0500000049
 
However, if the market rate of return is lower, say zero percent, one can more easily justify 
a pay-as-you-go program.  In this case, the internal rate of return is above zero as long as the rate 
of real wage growth is higher than -0.4 percent and 1.1 percent under current and future 
 7
demographic conditions, respectively (see Figure 3).  From table 1, we see that the 10, 20, and 30-
year averages all exceed -0.4 percent, implying that under current demographic conditions (R = 3), 
the internal rate of return in a pay-as-you-go program will be greater than the market rate (when the 
market rate is zero, as in Figure 3).   However, under future demographic conditions (R = 2), even 
if the market rate is zero, it seems questionable whether a pay-as-you-go system can outperform 
the private account program.  This is true since the 10, 20 and 30-year average growth rates for 
real wages are no greater than the break-even rate of 1.1 percent shown in Figure 3. 
 
2.3  Cash equivalents 
 In this section we estimate the difference in the net present value of an unfunded, pay-as-
you-go, program and a partially funded program, and we call the difference a “cash equivalent” or a 
willingness to pay to switch from an unfunded program to a partially funded program.8 
 The net present value of an unfunded program, ufNPV , is equal to  
(5) ∫∫ −−−=
TT
T
uf dttwrtRdttwrtNPV
0
)()exp()()exp( θθ  
and the net present value of a partially funded program, pfNPV , is equal to 
(6) 
∫∫
∫∫
−−−+
−−−−−=
TT
T
TT
T
pf
dttwrtdtrtA
dttwrtRdttwrtNPV
0
0
)()exp()exp(
)()1)(exp()()1()exp(
αθ
θαθα
 
In (6), the first two terms on the right give the net present value of the unfunded component.  The 
last two terms give the net present value of the funded component, which is zero (this is intuitive, 
but it can be demonstrated by substituting (1) and (3) into (6)).  Thus, we can rewrite (6) as  
(6’) 
uf
TT
T
pf
NPV
dttwrtRdttwrtNPV
)1(
)()1)(exp()()1()exp(
0
α
θαθα
−=
−−−−−= ∫∫  
Thus, using (5) and (6’) we can write the willingness to pay to switch from an unfunded to a 
partially funded program as 9 
                                                 
8 The cash equivalents that we estimate correspond to an individual that is just entering the workforce. 
9 Although we have not explicitly mentioned utility or any type of optimization process, our estimates of cash 
equivalents are equal to compensating variations derived from the Modigliani-Freidman, Permanent-Income 
Life-Cycle Model (PI-LC Model).  In the basic PI-LC Model, the individual calculates the present value of all 
future income (after-tax wage income plus social security income) and then spreads this wealth across the 
life-cycle in a manner that maximizes utility.  Although it may be obvious to experts in the life-cycle 
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(7)  
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ufufufpf
NPV
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α
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3   Results for the cash equivalents 
 Table 2 shows cash equivalents for different levels of the parameters.  In each row the cash 
equivalents are presented for the current ratio of workers to retirees (R = 3) and for the projected 
future ratio (R = 2).  The cash equivalents for the benchmark parameters are shown in the center 
column.  When R = 3 a worker would be willing to pay $16104 and when R = 3 that amount 
increases to $25,420.  Cash equivalents for lower parameter values are given to left and higher 
values to the right.  The first thing to notice in the table is that almost all of the cash equivalents 
are positive.  This indicates that under most circumstances presented, a worker would be willing to 
pay to be allowed to participate in a program with private accounts.  Table 3 gives the levels of 
variables that are needed for the pay-as-you-go program to be equal to the private account program.  
These break-even levels are given for our current ratio of workers to retirees (R = 3) and for the 
projected future ratio (R = 2).  The implications of the change in each variable are discussed below. 
Table 2.  Cash Equivalents -- What a worker would pay to swtich from the current  
pay-as-you-go system to the proposed system of partial private accounts
Bench-
mark
Growth Rate of Wages 0 0.3% 0.7% 1.0% 1.3% 1.7% 2.0%
R = 3 19,807 19,030 17,575 16,104 14,239 11,015 7,931
R = 2 26,628 25,731 25,664 25,420 24,971 23,978 22,870
Market Rate of Interest 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6%
R = 3 -37,194 -8,000 7,931 16,104 19,807 20,993 20,814
R = 2 1,435 16,000 22,870 25,420 25,628 24,637 23,099
Rate of Private Funding 0% 10% 20% 38% 50% 75% 100%
R = 3 0 4,268 8,535 16,104 21,338 32,006 42,675
R = 2 0 6,736 13,473 25,420 33,682 50,523 67,364
Age of Death 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
R = 3 44,054 33,791 24,506 16,104 8,501 1,622 -4,602
R = 2 44,054 37,212 31,022 25,420 20,352 15,766 11,607
 
                                                                                                                                                             
consumption area, we demonstrate in the appendix that the compensating variation that renders the PI-LC 
individual indifferent between participating and not participating in the President’s plan is exactly equal to the 
difference in the net present value of an unfunded and a partially funded social security program.   
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Table 3.  Break-Even Parameters -- Where workers are indifferent
between the current pay-as-you-go system and the proposed 
system of partial private accounts
Change 
Break-Even from Bench-
Value mark
Growth Rate of Wages
R = 3 2.6% 1.6%
R = 2 4.1% 3.1%
Market Rate of Interest
R = 3 1.4% -1.6%
R = 2 -0.1% -3.1%
Age of Death
R = 3 91 11
R = 2 112 32
 
3.1 The rate of wage growth 
 In the first column of Table 2 varying levels of wage growth are presented.  Under all levels 
of wage growth shown, workers would be willing to pay to participate in the private account 
program.  That is, they would have larger present value of wealth from the private program.  As the 
rate of wage growth increases, however, workers become less eager to participate in the private 
account program.  It is also worth noting that as the ratio of workers to retirees drops from 3 to 2 
workers become more willing to opt for private accounts.  Table 3 shows the same result presented 
in Figure 1.  When R = 3 a wage growth rate above 2.6 percent is required for individuals to be 
indifferent to the pay-as-you-go program.  When R = 2 the break-even rate of wage growth 
increases to 4.1 percent.   
 
3.2 The market rate of return 
 At the benchmark market rate of return, 3.0 percent, workers would be willing to pay to 
participate in the private account program.  As the market rate of return increases people generally 
become more eager to participate in the private account program.10  This is intuitive because the 
more people can earn on their private accounts the happier they are to participate in them.  
Conversely, at very low market rates the private accounts lose their luster.  If the market rate of 
return is at 1.0 percent or 0.0 percent, and R = 3, workers would be willing to pay not to 
                                                 
10 It is interesting to note that the cash equivalent does not increase monotonically with increases in the interest 
rate.  For example, when R = 3, and the interest rate is zero, the cash equivalent is negative because the non-
discounted benefits from a pay-as-you-go program exceed the costs.  However, as the interest rate rises, the 
present value of the benefits will decrease in absolute size quicker than the present value of the costs (because 
benefits are further in the future), and the cash equivalent becomes positive.  Next, the gap between 
discounted benefits and costs reaches a maximum between 5 and 6 percent (when R = 3).  As the interest 
rate continues to grow large the discounted value of the benefits and costs both approach zero, and the cash 
equivalent therefore declines toward zero in the limit (i.e., as r approaches infinity). 
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participate in the private account system and thus the cash equivalents are negative.  Even though 
the IRR of the pay-as-you-go system is quite low, as reported above, at very low market rates of 
return the current system can look attractive. Table 3 shows that the break-even market rate of 
return is 1.4 percent under current demographic conditions.  When the ratio of workers to retirees 
drops to 2, however, the break-even market rate of return becomes -0.1 percent.  At this level of R, 
any positive market return will make workers prefer the private account system. 
 
3.3 Age of death 
 In the pay-as-you-go program workers who die young get a very low IRR.  The worst case 
scenario is someone who pays into social security all of their working life and then dies at age 65.  
They will not receive any benefits and their effective IRR is negative infinity.  Table 2 shows that as 
the age of death increases the amount that people are willing to pay to participate in private 
accounts diminishes.  In fact a person who lives to age 95, if R = 3, would not want to participate 
in private accounts.  The break-even age is at 91.  This is because as you live longer you receive 
more and more benefits and the IRR of the pay-as-you-go program increases.  When R drops to 2, 
Table 2 shows that the break-even age of death increases dramatically to 112.  Virtually every one 
would prefer private accounts in this case. 
 One issue discussed about the current pay-as-you-go program is how different demographic 
groups fair.  Actuaries have shown that minority groups and those with less education tend to die 
earlier.  Our results, from Tables 2 and 3, show that those who die early are the ones most willing 
to pay to opt into private accounts.  These groups fair the worst under our current system and 
would benefit most from a switch to private accounts. 
 
3.4 Passing social security benefits on to your heirs. 
 In the current pay-as-you-go system you are not allowed to bequeath to your heirs the 
payments you have made over your working life.  In our current system if one spouse dies the other 
is entitled to the larger of their own benefits, or the benefits of the late spouse.  Thus if you are 
eligible for social security benefits and you spouse dies, all or most of the late spouses benefits are 
lost.  In the private account system, the amount remaining in your account when you die may be 
willed to your heirs.  This is related to the "age of death" section above.  Those who die the 
youngest would benefit most from being able to will their accounts to their heirs and those who live 
the longest would benefit the least from this provision. 
 
 11
3.5 The rate of private funding 
 In the third row of Table 2, cash equivalents for different levels of private funding are 
shown.  If the rate of private funding is 0 percent then we have our current system and a cash 
equivalent is irrelevant.  The benchmark is set at 38 percent which represents the President's 4 
percent private account contribution divided by the current 10.6 percent.  A 100 percent rate of 
private funding would indicate a totally private system with no pay-as-you-go system remaining.  
Notice that as the percentage of private funding increases, workers become more willing to pay to 
participate.  The intuition here is obvious.  If workers would pay a little to participate in a system 
that uses partial private accounts, they should be willing to pay more to participate in a system that 
makes greater use of private accounts. 
 
4   Conclusions 
 In this paper, a simple life-cycle framework was used to determine under what conditions a 
worker would benefit from switching from a pay-as-you-go social security system to one that 
includes some private accounts.  Under most conditions a worker would be willing to pay to be 
allowed to participate in a private accounts system.  The willingness to pay to participate increases 
as, the rate of wage growth decreases, as the market rate of return increases, as the age of death 
decreases and as the rate of private funding increases.  Using the current ratio of workers to 
retirees in the US (3 workers per retiree), we calculate that if the real market rate of return is very 
low, less that 1.4 percent, the current pay-as-you-go system would be preferable.  But as the ratio 
of workers to retirees declines from 3 to 2, the break-even level of the market rate declines to -0.1 
percent.  For workers who live a very long time, at least 91 years, the pay-as-you-go system is now 
preferable.  Here again, however, as the ratio of workers to retirees declines from 3 to 2 that break-
even age increases dramatically to 112 years of age.  With the exception of the two situations just 
mentioned, the switch to a system that allows for some contributions to private accounts seems to 
be beneficial to most workers. 
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Appendix 
The purpose of this appendix is to show that the cash equivalents calculated above are 
equal to compensating variations from the basic Permanent-Income Life-Cycle Model.  We rely on 
notation already introduced in the body of the text, and the basic model is as follows. 
 Inflation adjusted (real) consumption spending for a representative individual at time t is 
denoted by c(t), and the agent receives utility at time t according to )(ln))(( tctcU = .  The rate of 
impatience or time preference is ρ .  We start by analyzing the optimal consumption path for an 
individual who participates in an unfunded program.  At time zero the individual enters the workforce 
and solves to following problem11 
(A1) ∫ −
T
dttct
0
)(ln)exp(:max ρ  
subject to  
(A2) )()()( tctrktk −=•  
(A3) uf
T
NPVdttwrtk ∫ +−=
0
)()exp()0(  
(A4) 0)( =Tk  
where k(t) is the individual’s savings account.  Equation (A2) states that any income that is not 
consumed flows into the asset account.  In (A3) we take advantage of the well-known principle of 
life-cycle optimal control models that cash-flow timing is relevant only to the extent it affects the 
present value of lifetime wealth.  The first term on the right on (A3) is the present value of pre-tax 
wage income, and the second term is the net present value of an unfunded social security program.12  
Thus, we compress wages and social security income into an initial capital endowment.  The solution 
                                                 
11 This simple specification of preferences leads to time-consistent behavior – the individual will stick to the 
planned consumption profile. 
12 This writing of the wealth constraint implies that the individual perfectly anticipates his social security 
benefits.  In an unfunded system, benefits are a function of the wage rate, the ratio of workers to retirees, 
and the social security tax rate.  Each of these items, especially the last, may be difficult to predict.  Of 
course, since 1999 the Social Security Administration has mailed annual statements with projected benefits 
to all households above the age of 25, but these statements are based on current tax law and therefore may 
not be accurate.  We recognize that the assumption of perfect foresight may be particularly questionable in 
this instance.  Dominitz et al. (2003) document widespread pessimism about social security benefits among 
young workers, implying that young individuals may underestimate the level of benefits they will receive. 
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consumption profile is the same whether the individual is given an initial endowment equal to the 
present value of lifetime income, or if these payments are spread out over time.13   
 Simple application of the Maximum Principle gives the optimal consumption path as a 
function of initial wealth, )0(k : 
(A5) 
)exp(1
))exp(()0()(
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trktc ρ
ρρ
−−
−=  
In a partially funded system, instead of (A3) we have 
(A6) pf
T
NPVdttwrtk ∫ +−=
0
)()exp()0(  
The compensating variation, cv, that would render the individual indifferent between an 
unfunded and a partially funded program is the initial payment that equalizes the consumption paths 
across the two alternatives, thus, the cv is the solution to 
(A7) uf
T
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T
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00
)()exp()()exp(  
which implies ufpf NPVNPVcv −= , which is identical to the cash equivalent estimates in Section 
2.3.14  
 
 
                                                 
13 If payments are spread out over time, the problem becomes a two-stage optimal control problem with a 
switch in the state equation at retirement (a switch from wage to social security income).  The solution to 
the two-stage problem is identical to the solution to our problem.   
14 It is worth mentioning that the compensating variation from this control model is not a function of the rate of 
time preference.  That is, the degree of impatience does not affect the individual’s willingness to pay to 
switch plans.  This is seen by noting that the rate of time preference is not found in equation (A7).  In a well-
known article, Feldstein (1985) establishes a link between impatience and individual welfare from 
participating in a pay-as-you-go program, and we could very easily establish the same link in our model if 
social security benefits were incorrectly estimated as in Feldstein’s model.   
